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Abstract 
Two parties may agree to a mutually binding contract that will govern their 
behavior after an uncertain event becomes known. As there is no agent who can both 
observe this uncertain outcome and enforce the contract, contingent agreements are 
precluded. However, the parties recognize that the uncertain event will be common 
knowledge for them, and that they will be able to renegotiate the contract voluntarily, 
provided that they both gain in doing so. When structuring the original contract they can 
foresee this renegotiation phase. Efficient contracts are those that perform best, when 
taking this into account. 
This paper studies the form of such efficient contracts. It is shown that it is always 
better to have a contract than it is to have none, no matter which party has the 
preponderence of bargaining strength in the renegotiation phase. We also study whether 
renegotiation can substitute completely for the absence of contingent contracts. We 
characterize a family of cases where it can. And we present some "second-best" results in 
others, where it cannot. 
* This research was supported by National Science Foundation grant number IRI-85-07291. The authors thank 
Michael Whinston and John Moore for comments on the earlier version. 
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1.Introduction 
In this paper we discuss the process of contract formation and contract revision fn a 
two-party relationship. At the time that the contract can first be written some 
uncertainty about the future is present. However, although both of the contracting parties 
can observe the resr,lution of this uncertainty before any payoff-relevant actions are 
required, we assume that it is not possible to implement contracts which are specified ex 
ante, before the uncertainty is resolved, and are contingent upon these outcomes .. This 
contractual "incompleteness" or "imperfection" is at the heart of the phenomena we study 
and is justified as follows. As parties have conflicting interests the contract needs to be 
enforced by some third party, or outside agency, who has, or is invested with, the power to 
punish the participants for failing to comply with its provisions. A "full" specification of 
the contractual relations would include the actions to be taken in various contingencies and
the enforcement procedures to be used. In our model, the outside enforcement agency
cannot observe the resolution of uncertainty at all. This is a way of capturing the more 
realistic viewpoint of limited, costly, observability which more accurately characterize5 
reality. (Further discussion of the use of this non verifiability assumption is given below.) 
Having stated what the enforcement agency cannot do, we must be e.'{plicit about 
the powers with which it is endowed. We assume that the enforcement agency can observe 
the chosen action and can compare it to the contractual specifications. These specifications 
can be a precise description of unique actions that have been agreed upon, or, more 
generally, can consist of a set of allowable actions within which one of the parties has the 
full discretion to choose the actual result. If the chosen action violates these specifications, 
a large (unspecified) punishment can be.inflicted. For those contracts in which limited 
control is delegated to one side or the other, the action chosen within the allowable range
will be that in the best interest of the controlling party. Moreover, the agency can observe 
which party has been given the power of choosing the "renegotiated" contract.
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One principal focus of this paper is to present a theory that predicts whether a 
contract will be signed ex ante. Assume that a contract, if signed, ca.Ii itill be voluntarily 
renegotiated. As both parties can ·correctly anticipate the outcome of renegotiation, the 
end result will be sensitive to information. But the renegotiation will be conducted under 
the constraint that the status quo is that generated by the first contract. Delaying 
agreement by not writing an initial contract, means that the ex post outside opportunity of 
the agent is the same status quo level that was available ex ante. Since a first period 
contract generates status quo levels which are sensitive to information, the comparison 
between the optimal ex-ante contract, followed .Qx renegotiation, and no contract followed
by an ex post efficient agreement is not obvious. 
A second principal focus of the paper is the issue of renegotiation of contracts. 
When a ful.ly optimal contract is not possible at the initial date, it is natural to presume 
that ex post inefficiencies will be eliminated by mutually advantageous renegotiation. The 
initial contract determines the baseline from which the subsequent bargaining will take 
place. In a situation of perfect information, such as that arising after the uncertainty is
resolved and is observable by both parties, it is natural to believe that efficient agreement 
will result, and it is also natural for the baseline or status quo to influence which ex post 
efficient point, among those superior for both players, will be selected. We inquire when 
the first best can be reached through renegotiation. 
Before outlining our results it may be useful to quickly review the related literature. 
The lack of verifiability by a third party of information known by two parties is usually 
accepted as a good reason for the impossibility of having contracts contingent on that 
information. The implementation literature (Maskin(1985)) suggests that even in that case 
complex games could be constructed whose Nash equilibria would implement first best 
contingent allocations. So non verifiability is not enough and must be supplemented by an 
assumption of restricted complexity or bounded rationality. No effort is usually made to 
justify rigorously this second assumption (see Huberman and Kahn (1986) for such an 
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attempt) .
The assumption of non verifiability is usually traced back to Bt;lil (1983) who shows 
that a non-<:ontingent non-enforceable contract can survive in a world where markets ·are 
very incomplete and only bundles of commodities (labor and effort) can be traded. The
role of reputation and the use of hostages to mitigate the absence of enforcement 
mechanisms has been studied but their effect is limited to rather special circumstances.
One line of research attempts to show why non-enforceable contracts can survive 
because they are self enforceable. For example, Bull (1987) shows that a contract where a 
firm and a worker behave honestly can exist because it is a Nash equilibrium of the induced 
repeated moral hazard problem. The work on repeated games is relevant to this question 
but its reliance on very long relationships restricts its applicability. 
The lack of verifiability of some variables does not eliminate the possibility of 
contracting conditionally on a restricted set of publically observed variables. Contracts 
which delegate control to one of the parties either unconditionally or conditionally on some 
observable variables are particularly interesting because they can make use of the 
acquisition of information achieved by the controlling party. Such contracts have been 
exploited to provide a basis for a theory of firm integration (Grossman and Hart (1986)) or
to explain the structure of debt which has an influence on the publically observable event 
bankruptcy used to reallocate control (Aghion and Bolton (1986)). Grossman and Hart 
(1987) apply the same sort of idea to explain the charter of a widely held corporation. 
An alternative to a contract based on limited verifiable information is to renegotiate 
given the status quo provided by an initial contract. Hart and Moore (1985) study trade 
between two agents who do not know yet their valuation of the transaction. Courts can 
only observe the agreed upon prices. and whether or not a transaction .has taken place. A 
first contract is signed conditionally on these observable variables and anticipating a 
renegotiation once the valuations are known - in general the first best is not achievable. 
They continue to assume that messages sent ex post by agents are verifiable, reaching the 
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conclusion of the implementation literature that a complex game can be constructed to 
implement the first best. 
Huberman and Kahn {1986a) study a model where the action of one party is not 
verifiable and where the suboptimal initial contract is used to protect a party from the non 
verifiable action that the other party could take. As in Hart and Moore the initial contract 
signed serves as a status quo position for the renegotiation ex post. 
�inally, Grout (1984) and Tirole (1986) have studied the impact of contractual
incompleteness on the level of investment in the relationship. 
We consider a two party model where the contingent and non verifiable event 
affects only the utility function of one party. 
O.ur model is close to the first part of Hart and Moore (1985) in that the court's 
ability to observe is very limited. We assume that the court can only observe a set of 
agreed prices and quantities ex ante among which the party sensitive to the information 
will be able to select once informed, and the court can observe to which agent the control 
of the renegotiated price and quantity pair has been given. 
Contrary to Hart and Moore who look at Nash equilibria, we use the Stackelberg 
assumption of the principal-agent literature and assume that the principal, whose utility 
function is not affected by information,is the Stackelberg leader. He designs the game to 
play by choosing one of the following options: 
a) no contract ex ante and choosing a contract ex post.
b) choosing ex ante a set of price-quantity pafrs among which the agent, once
informed, selects a pair to be used as the status quo of the renegotiation in which the
principal retains full control. 
c) choosing a price-quantity contract used as the status quo in the renegotiation in
which the agent is in control. 
This set of games exhaust the possibilities under the limited observability 
assumption we make on the court. 
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Section 2 defines the model we use and shows that the game in which the control of 
renegotiation is given to the agent (game c above) is a special case oft.he game b. Section 
3 characterizes the first best allocations. We show in section 4 that, under quite general
circumstances we can predict that a contract will be signed ex ante because no contract 
(game a) is dominated by a well chosen game c and therefore by a game b according to 
the result of section 2. Section 5 studies the general second best optimization problem '.hat
the principal must solve and characterizes some situations in which the first best is 
implementable. Examples are discussed in section 6.
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2. The Model
A. Contracts 
The two players will be called the principal and the agent. They choose two 
decision variable, x and t. In some applications x will be a quantity of some economic
good, perhaps produced by the principal and consumed by the agent, and t will be a 
monetary transfer from the agent to the principal. In other applications, however, their 
interpretation may be quite different. 
The two players are uncertaln about a random variable 0, whose distribution they 
believe to be F. This variable is payoff relevant only to the agent. 
Thus the two players von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions are 
(2.1) 
Up= f(t,x)
U A= u(x,t,8)
We will always assume that ft > 0, fx < 0, ux > 0, ut < 0 and u8 > 0. This last
' condition means that higher values of 0 are, at constant (x,t), always "good news". The 
other assumptions follow quite naturally in the interpretation given above, and in others 
discussed below. We will also assume the usual single crossing property, 
. a [ · u x ]
88 -� > 0. 
In a world of costless contracting and perfect contract enforcement the players 
would agree on a contingent arrangement regarding both x and t as a function of 0. 
This paper concerns cases in which such a plan is not feasible, at least by means of a direct 
contract fixed before 0 becomes known. Let us therefore be precise about the type of 
contracts that are feasible, and about the structure of the process that determines how the 
players can enforce and modify the contract after they both learn the value of 0. 
We assume that if a contract is offered at all, it is selected by the principal in such a 
way that the agent will achieve an expected utility of w , his reservation level of utility. 
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One option the principal retains is to offer no contract at all to the agent. If this happens, 
the principal must offer the agent a proposal, after 8 becomes know, �at still achieves 
this reservation value of w. 
A contract at the initial point in time can have two types of provisions. The first
specifies an outcome, or a set of outcomes, that are agreed upon. The enforcement agency, 
which we sometimes call a "court", can.observe whether the actual outcome coincides with,
or, more generally, lies in, this contractual stipulation. The court has ihe power to enforce 
this provision - perhaps by inflicting a large unspecified punishment if it is violated -
unless the parties voluntarily agree to replace'this contract with some other agreement. In 
this sense the agreed upon outcomes are binding upon both parties. 
If this contractual provision specifies a set of outcomes, it is understood that the
agent retains the right to choose among them and to insist upon the outcome that is best 
for himself, unless a mutually superior outcome arises in the renegotiation phase. Note 
that it wouid never be beneficial to specify a set of outcomes and give the principal the 
right to chMse among them because, as the principal's utility is independent of 8, the sub 
optimal members of this set would be irrelevant. 
To summarize the first phase of ?- contract, there are two possible specifications.
Either a set of outcomes (perhaps a singleton) is delineated and the agent is given control 
among them, or a single outcome is specified upon which the principal can insist. 
At this point 8 becomes known by both parties, but not by the court. The reason 
for this is that 8 may actually be quite a complex set of circumstances. Although they 
may be understood perfectly well by the parties themselves, neither side may be able to 
actually prove to a court exactly what these circumstances are, or at least this may be 
infeasible in a reasonable amount of time and without much cost. 
After 8 is revealed, the parties have the opportunity to renegotiate. The rules of 
the bargaining games that we consider are particularly simple. If the agent is given control 
over the possible outcomes at the first stage, the principal is given the po•ver at this stage 
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to make a take-it-or leave-it offer that, if rejected, will result in the agent's original 
choice being enforced by the court. Conversely, if it is the principal who is guaranteed the 
right to insist upon a particular outcome, then the agent is given the exclusive right to hold 
the principal down to that level of utility in the renegotiation phase. 
Thus there are two distinct·forms of contract. The extensive form games 
corresponding to these contrac�s are shown in figures 1 and 2. The extensive form of the 
game corresponding to no contract is given in figure 3. 
In either form of contract the court must be able to observe the outcome chosen by
the party given control; it must be able to compare this outcome to the specified set of 
' ' 
outcomes; and it must be able to preserve the right of the party specified as the . 
Stackelberg lead�r in the renegotiation phase. If the court is given these powers and no 
others - for example the court cannot observe the strategies played in any normal or 
extensive form game the players might put in place by virtue of their contract - then these 
two forms of contract exhaust all the possiblities. 
One might think that our specification of such a simple form of renegotiation - the 
making of a take-it-or-leave-it offer- is too simple and unrealistic. Perhaps the parties 
will have recourse to some other form of coordination in which a different bargaining 
outcome is chosen, say the Nash solution with the original point being the disagreement 
outcome. This is, of course, possible. Perhaps an interesting theory could be developed 
along these lines. However any such a renegotiation phase, if specified as an extensive form 
game, will necessarily involve strategic choices by both players. If these strategies are 
themselves unobservable by the court, there will be no way to insure that this other 
bargaining solution is, in fact, the result of such renegotiation.1 Thus, given our 
assumptions about what is and what is not observable by the court, the two contractual 
lAnd Maskin (1985), Moore and Repullo (1985) have shown that if strategies in a game 
the players agree to play are observable and verifiable by the court, then the first-best 
solution is obtainable under fiarly general conditions. But the motivation our paper is 
that their strategies are likely to be unverifiable. 
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forms described above exhaust all possibilities. 
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B Pavoffs 
Many of our results are obtained with the general payoff functioM ·�.l), possibly
with the addition of some mild and well known qualitative conditions.· Two special models 
suggest themselves, and particular results that compare the efficiency of alternative 
contractual forms in these models will �e given in section 5 and 6.
The first is a model of a buyer whose valuation function for a good he is purchasing 
is parameterized by 8. The buyer is the agent, x is the quantity purchased and t is the 
amount of money paid. If the buyer is risk-neutral in money, then his utility is 
U A= -t + u( x,8) 
The seller, assumed to be risk averse, produces the good with constant returns to scale.
Without loss of generality we can set unit cost at unity. Thus, 
Up=f(t- x) 
The second model concerns a firm and a worker. The worker's utility for income, x, 
depends on 8. Perhaps the worker does not know the result of his investments in his 
non-human wealth; or perhaps some aspects of his personal circumstances, such as future 
health or the tastes of his family members, are unknown. Then, if the worker is 
risk-neutral in his effort, t, 
U A = -t + u( x, 8) 
as above. The principal is the firm. The firm's profits are concave and increasing in the 
worker's effort. Hence, 
Up= f{t) - x. 
[Note that here the roles of t and x are reversed from that of the more usual notation.] 
{(x,t)} 
12
p 
' 
'\ 
' 
' 
Nature 
' 
\ 
' 
A
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
p
\ 
\ 
' 
\. 
FIGURE l 
82
' . 
. . 
u(x( 81),t( 81),81)
DELEGATION AND P-LED RENEGOTIATION 
(x,t) 
13 
p 
Nature 
' 
' 
'\ 
A 
"
/p\ 
'e2
accepts rejects 
I \ .. 
f(x(81),t(81)) 
u(x( 81), t( 81)., 81) 
FIGURE£ 
f(x, t) 
u(x,t,8) 
A-LED RENEGOTIATION 
14 
p 
Nature
' 
' 
' 
p
' 
' 
' 
A
/\ 
' 
' 
accepts rejects 
I \ 
f(x( 81),t( 81)) 
u(x( 81),t( 81),81) 
FIGURE a 
NO CONTRACT 
0 
-
w 
15 
C. General Results About the Efficiency Qf Alternative Contractual f()rms 
Let us introduce a somewhat abbreviated terminology for the contractual forms 
I 
discussed in section 2A. When the agent is delegated authority to choose the outcome 
within some set and the principal has the upper hand in the renegotiation phase, we will 
say the contract specifies delegation and P-led renegotiation. When the set in which the 
agent can select is reduced to a singleton, we say that delegation and P-led renegotiation 
reduces to a simple contract and P-led renegotiation. When the agent is given the power 
in the renegotiation phase we will say that the contractual form is A-led renegotiation. 
Finally, if no agreement is made ex ante we will call it !ill contract - that is, "no contract" 
will itself be considered a form of contract. 
The results of any of these contractual forms will be a pair of realizations x( 0), t( 0), 
as determined by the rules of these games and the self-interest of the players. We will say, 
for example, that x( O),t( 0) is implementable via delegation and P-led renegotiation if
there is a contract of this form that results in these outcomes. Likewise for 
implementability via the other forms of contract. 
Theorem l 
The utility reached by the principal in a contract with A-led renegotiation can be 
reached or e.xceeded for all 0 in a contract with delegation and P-led renegotiation. 
Proof 
In the proof, we first show that if x( 0), t( 0) is implementable via A-led
renegotiation then it is also implementable in the ordinary sense of incentive compatibility 
(as if fJ were the private information of the agent). Then we show that if x( O),t( 0) is
incentive compatible, then there will e.xist another pair x( O),t( 0) that is implementable via
delegation and P-led renegotiation that is preferred by the principal for all 0. The 
arguments are straightforward. Take x( O),t( fJ) implementable via A-led renegotiation.
Then there exists x, t such that, 
(2.2) 
and 
(2.3) 
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f(t,x) = f(t(8),x(8)) for any e 
u(x( 8),t( 8),8) � u(x,t,9)
for all (x,t) such that f(t,x) � f(t,x). This is precisely the condition for the incentive
compatibility of x( O),t.( 0). Since, for I = 8, we have
u(x(8),t(8), 8) � u(x(l)t(l),O)
because x(O'),t(O') satisfies (2.3). 
Now consider any incentive-compatible x( O),t( 0). This means that for all 0,(1, 
u(x(8),t(8),8) � u(x(t),t(O'),O).
Delegate to the a.gent the right to choose within 
{(x,t) Ix= x(8), t = t(O), for some 8}. 
Following P-led renegotiation the agent will achieve the utility u(x( O),t( 8),0) though 
perhaps via a different choice of actions i( 8),t( 0) for the principal,
. 
f(t(O), i(O)) � f(x(O),t(O)).
Q.E.D. 
Three remarks about this theorem should be made. First, the absence of 0 from 
the utility function of the principal is crucial. Second, we cannot, a priori, rank the 
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efficiency of "no contract" -this is the subject of section 4. Third, simple contracts with
P-led renegotiation are not flexible enough to reach the entire incentive compatible family. 
Therefore, if for some reason the principal cannot delegate discretion to the agent, he may 
in fact be better off giving the agent the power to lead the renegotiation phase, despite the 
general result of this theorem to the contrary -see section 6. 
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3. The First Best 
Let us begin by examining the first-best solutions to the proble.iii, and the
applications given in section 2. 
The general problem, ex ante is 
subject to JU AdF,(8) � w. 
The first�rder conditions for this problem are 
fx(t*( 8),x*( 8)) + ).*ux(x*( 8),t*( 8),8) = 0 
ft(t*(8),x*(O)) + ).*ut(x*(O),t*(0),8) = 0 
(3.1) J u(x*(O),t*(0),9) = w. 
In the case of a buyer with unknown valuation facing a risk averse seller with constant unit
costs, we have, in addition to (3.1), 
r ( t * ( 8) - x* ( 8)) = ,\ * 
r(t*(8) -x*(8)) = ,\* ux(x*(8),8)
Hence, eliminating ,\ *, ux ( x* ( 8), 8) = 1. 
In the case of a worker facing a. firm with unknown productivity, we have
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-1 + ,\* ux (x* (O),O) = 0
f1 ( t * ( 0)) - 1 = 0 
Note that in each case the agent's utility at the first-best is monotone in 0. This 
follows from the property that the cross-derivative uxO is positive for ex ample, in the
case of the buyer and seller; 
d uA ( x * (O )  ,t* (O ) ,0 )
d B
In the case of the vmrker and the firm, 
d x* 
- - d t * ( O )  + u (x* ( B),8) �-
d B  x d B  
+ u B (x* ( O),B) = u0(x*(0),0) 
dUA ( x *( B) ,t*(B) , B) dx * ( B) 
--____,,_-=-------- = ux( x* ( 0), 0) d B + u 8( x* ( B), B) d B  
which is likewise positive because a B > 0. 
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4. Th Domination Qf "No Contract" 
In this section we show that having "no contra.ct" is, under quit& general conmtions,
dominated by a contra.ct in which the agent is given the leadership power in the 
renegotiation phase. By virtue of theorem 1, therefore, we will have shown that "no 
contract" can never be the efficient form of contract. The optimal contract will, in general, 
be of the form of delegation and P-led renegotiation. 
The control of the relationship in the� J2Qfil. bargaining phase, in practice, depends
upon details of their specific irreversible inves:ments and their foregone outside
opportunities. There may be cases where the principal must give the agent the bargaining 
. advantage in the renegotiation phase. The importance of the result in this section is that, 
in such cases, it is better for the principal to contract with such an agent than it is to
refuse to contract at all. 
One instance of this loss of bargaining power may arise when the principal is a 
worker contracting with a firm and the worker's unkno-wn ability enters the firm's 
production function. Once the worker has worked for this firm for a. while, long enough for 
his "ability", which may be the realization of his "long run potential", to become known, 
he may have lost his mobility or marketability in other jobs and may, therefore, be held to 
his contractual level of utility by the agent, his employer. According to the theorem of this
section, it will al ways be more efficient, e."'C ante, for this worker to contract with the firm, 
rather than to wait until the uncertainty is resolved. 
This result depends on some mild assumptions about the form of payoff functions. 
We first assume that both goods are "normal" for both players. That is, there are
monotonic loci of pairs (x,t) at which the marginal rates of substitution are constant. 
Thus, 
� [�t- J > 0 
d t ux 
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These imply, 
( 4.1) 
(4.2) 
( 4.3) 
( 4.4) 
The principal result of this section can now be stated. 
Theorem ,2 
Assuming (4.1) - (4.4), and appropriate boundary behavior for the derivatives of f 
and u there ex ists a contract with A-led renegotiation which is superior for the principal 
to not offering any contract to the agent. 
Proof 
The proof proceeds constructively by defining a contract which involves A-led 
renegotiation and which dominates no contract. The contract will be denoted x ,  t. For 
each 8, the agent will give the principal the utility f(x ,  t) by choosing an ex post 
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efficient x( 0), t( 0). Thus, the significance of x, t is that it guarantees a lrvel of utility 
for the principal. The specific pair x,t is not important. For each value of 0 we will 
compare the utility level arrived at under the contract x,t with the utility levels achieved 
under no contract. In the former case, the principal gets f(x, t) and the agent gets the 
utility that corresponds to this level, given 0. In the latter case it is the agent's level that 
is invariant to 0, being w, and the principal's realized utility will increase with 0. 
We note that since the agent gets w on average in either contract, he will realize 
above w when 0 is high and below w when 0 is low. The idea of the proof is to show 
that under the contract, when 0 is low, the principal gains at the agent's expense and that 
this gain is larger than the loss the principal sustains when at, high 0, the agent's power in 
the renegotiation phase allows him to do better than w. The method of proof is to 
examine the slope of the utility possibility set, for each 0, in the region between the points 
realized by these two contracts. We will show that per unit change in the agent's utility, 
the principal's utility is more sensitive when 0 is low than when 0 is high. That is why 
the positive changes in the principal's utility outweigh the negative changes. We now 
proceed to t.�1is demonstration. 
soh·e 
(4.5) 
(4.6) 
In the renegotiation phase, after the contract x, t has been signed, the agent will 
max u(x,t,O) 
subject to 
f(x,t) � f (x,t)
Let the value of this problem be denoted <P (f(x,t),O). 
Now consider the following system of equations: 
fx (x,t) '+ >. ux (x,t,O) = 0
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� 
(4.7) ft(x,t) + >. ut (x,t,O) = 0
(4.8) u(x,t,O) - w 
(4.9) J <P (f(�,t),O) dF(O) - w
for the four unknowns x, t, 0, >.. Under some tecp.nical, but ordinary, conditions on the 
boundary behavior of the partial derivatives of. f and u, a solution will exist. 
The interpretation of these equations is M follows: Given x, t we know that the 
solution of (4.6-4.9) will generally result in (x(O), t(O)) :f (x,t). However, there will be
some value of 0, called e, at which x·,t is ex post efficient and therefore at which it
remains in force after renegotiation. In addition we know that the level of utility f(x, t) 
that the principal proposes to guarantee himself in the contract will provide the agent with 
the ex ante utility w ,  (4.9). Equation (4.8) says that this level of ex ante utility is 
realized ex post at precisely the same 0 at which x,t is invariant to renegotiation. 
This contract (x, t) is generally not efficient in the ex ante sense that it is not the 
best A-led contract. However it always dominates "no contract" as we now show. 
(4.10) 
(4.11) 
(4.12) 
Let us write the first-order conditions for the problem (4.5) 
µ fx(x,t) + ux (x,t,O) - 0
µft(x,t) + ut (x,t,O) - O
f(x,t) - f(x,t) 
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint. We know that 
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<Pf (f (x, t ),8) = -µ( 8) 
and that µ( 8) > 0. 
Let ¢( u, 8) be defined by 
.t/JC<P(f,8),8) = f ,  for all f,8. 
Then 
1 
t/Ju(u,B) ::= ¢ f ( t/J ( u ' 0) ' 8) 
f 
f(x, t) 
. 
U< U 
-
w 
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FIGURE i 
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Let us compare the principal 's utility under this contract to that obtained under no 
contract. The change in the principal's utility is 
(4.13) 
<P( f ( x' t)' 0) J J tfiu(u,O)du dF(O).
-
w 
We can divide the integral over B into two parts, above and below B: 
(4.14) 
that 
( 4.15) 
0 w <t>( r ( x, t), o) - J J 1/'u(�, �) du dF( B) + J J tfiu ( u, 0) du dF( 0)
¢( f(x,t),O) . e w 
\Ve show that in the range of the first double integral, where
-
u(x( O),t( 0),0) < w 
0 < 0
1i'u(u(x(8),t(8),8),8) < - .,\ 
and, conversely, in the range of the second double integral where 
-
u(x( O),t( 0),0) > w 
B > 0 
that 
. 
(4.16) tfiu(u(x(O),t(0),0),B) > - ,\.
Note that 
and that 
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. 1 
µ(O) = --:---
1 1 
tPu(u,O) - ¢ f ( 1/J ( u , 0) , 0) - µ ( 0) 
Therefore (4.15) and (4.16) will be proven if we can demonstrate that 
(4.17) 
where 
aµ ( e j
d B  < o. 
Differentiate the system {4.10 -4.12) totally and apply Cramer's rule, ob taining
. 
b � � = -uxe(fx(µfxt + uxt) - fx(µftt + u tt)
+ ut,ft(µfx:x 7 ux:x) - fx(µfxt + uxt))
µfx:x + ux:x 
fl - det µfxt + uxt
f x 
. 
At the ex post efficient point, 0, we can use {4.10) and {4.11) to rewrite (4.li) as 
1 
+ u (µ(ff f f ) __ (u�ux:x - uxuxt)) t 0 t xx. - x xt - µ " 
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and, under our normality condition, (4.1 - 4.4), the right hand side of �his equation is 
dµ 
positive, hence d e  < 0, and hence (4.15) and (4.16) hold under the specified
conditions. 
Now we can bound (4.14) using (4.15), 
(4.18) 
. 
8 --J J w iVu�u:B) du dF(B]
¢ (f (x , t),�) 
. 
JOJ ¢(f(x,t),8)! ,\du dF(D) 
w 
. J 0 • . = -,\ [¢(f(x, t ),8) -WJ dF( 0)
In the range of the second double integral ( 4.16) implies 
(4.19) 
¢( f(x,t),8) J J tPu(u,O)du dF(O)
0 w 
¢( f ( x, t ) , 8 . 
! J J (-,\) du dF(O)
Ow 
= - ,\I [<P(f(�,t),8) -W] dF(O)
. e 
Combining the lower bounds (4.18) and (4.19) we have that (4.13) is bounded
below by 
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-A J ¢(f(�,i), e)-w) dF(D) 
= 0. 
Q.E.D. 
by virtue of ( 4.9 ) .  
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5. Implementation Qf First-Best Allocations
First, we can observe that only the mechanisms of delegation and P-led 
renegotiation have the potential _of'reaching the first best in generic situations. The no 
contract mechanism produces a constant (in 8) utility level for the agent, the A-led 
renegotiation produces a constant utility level for the principal, two unlikely events in the
first best. The incentive compatible allocations corresponding to delegation without 
renegotiation require a. very particular relationsµip between x( 8) and t( 8) namely 
x'( 8)ux(x( 8),t( 8),8) + t'( 8)ut(x( 8),t( 8),8) = 0 almost everywhere
which will not be satisfied in general. 
Therefore let us consider delegation with P-led renegotiation and CJnsider w*( 8) a
level of utility achieved by the agent in a first best allocation. 
\Ve will say that w*(. )  is implementable via delegation and P-led renegotiation if
there exists an incentive compatible mechanism (x(8),t(8)): e - IR2 such that:
(5.1) u(x(8),t(8),8) = w*(O) 8 £ e. 
The principal then proposes this mechanism which provides the status quo levels 
w*(O) for the agent and e.'{ post ma.'<lmizes his objective function under the agent's
individual rationality constraint: 
u(x,t,O) > w*( 0) 
reaching in this way an efficient allocation in which the agent obtains w*( 0). 
Incentive compatibility requires:
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(5.2) x ' (O)ux (x(O), t(0), 6) + t' (O)ut(x(O) , t(0) ,8) = 0 almost everywhere
Under the single crossing properiy (SCP), : d [-:: ] > 0, Vx,t,8, we
know (Guesnerie and Laffont (1984)) that the second order condition:
(5.3) x ' (O) .� 0
' 
together with (5.2) yield necessary and sufficient conditions for incentive compatibility. 
Therefore, we have the desired result if the solution x( 8) obtained from (5.1)(5.2) 
satisfies (5.3). 
Differentiating (5.1) and using (5.2) gives: 
(5.4) u /x( 8),t( 8),8) = w*' ( 8).
Differentiating again (5.4) we have:
a [ u x ( x ( e ) , t ( e ) , e )1 _ *"U9e(x(8),t(B),O) - x'(O)· ut(x(O),t(B),8)· a e -11t ( x ( 0) ' t ( 8) ' B); -W (8)
or in view of (SCP) and ut < 0,
(5.5) sign x'(O) =sign [w*"(O)- u8o(x(O),t(O),O)J.
I'rom (5.5) we have immediately: 
32 
Theorem ;i. Under the single crossing p,:-operty and u00  = 0 ,  the first best agent's utility
profile w*( ·) is implementable via delegation and P-led renegotiation iff 
w*1( 0) � 0 and w*• ( 0) � 0 for any 0.
¥/e will restrict now the analysis to the utility functions 
(5.6) -t + O v(x) v' > 0 v• < 0
which satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 3. 
In more general cases the argument above does not enable us to develop a necessary 
and sufficient condition because u00  is a function of the unknown mechanism (x(·),t(·)).
Let us call ¢>( w, 0) the solution of 
Ma..x f(t,x) 
u(x,t,O) = w 
i.e. the principal's utility level after renegotiation if the status quo level is w for the
agent. 
Under the assumptions of Theorem 3, and assuming e::: [fi, 0), the optimization
program of the principal can be written. 
. 0 �(�) J fi ¢>(w(O),O)dF(O)
subject to 
0· J fi w(B)dF(O) = w
WI ( 0) ) 0 and W • ( 0) ) 0 
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Defining two state variables w( 8) and z( 8) = w' ( 8) and the control µ( 8) we can 
rewrite this program: 
(5.7) 
(5.8) 
-0 
Max J ¢(w(8),8) dF(O) 
µ (·) 
fi 
-0 J fi w(8) dF(8) = w (>.)
z( B) = µ( B) { v 2( 8))
µ( 8) > 0 
z( 8) � 0
Th� shape of the optimal solution will depend on which of the constraints (5. 7) or 
(5.8) is binding. If none of the constraints is binding, the first best is achieved and we 
have: 
for any e 
7J J p w*( O)dF( 0) = w 
Suppose now that the first best is increasing so that constraint (5.7) is not binding. 
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The Hamiltonian is then: 
.
(5.9) H = ¢(w(O),O)f(O) - ,\w(O)f(O) + v1{8)z(O) + v2(0)µ(8) 
From the Pontryci:gin p�nciple we get: 
(5.11) 
with the transversality conditions: 
1faximization of (5.9) with respect toµ gives: 
(5.13) V2 ( 0 and µ = 0 if V2 < 0. 
Whenever the optimal solution w( ·) is strictly convex on an interval it entails the
same constant value <Pw· From (5.13), w• > 0 implies µ > 0 which implies V2 = 0 
on this interval. (5.11) implies v1 = 0 hence <P'w = ,\ o n this interval.
From (5.13) we see that when the solution is not strictly convex it is linear. Let
8081, s uc h an interval where it is not convex. Integrating (5.10) between 80 and 81 and
using the continuity of the Pontryagin multipliers at 80 and 01 we have : 
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As the state variables are continuous we have 
w ' (80) = w'(81) 
to complete the characterization of the interval ( 80, 91) (see Fig. 5) 
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Observe that the linear piece in fig.5 can only be obtained from a simple contract 
x, t since x,t generates a linear utility·level, 
.. .. 
w ( 8) - e v(x) � t
and if x were not constant w( 8) would not be linear .. · 
Suppose now that the first best is convex but first decrea.sing and then increasing. 
' 
Similar arguments as above show then that when it is increasing, the optimal sol'!ltion is 
analogous to the first best with a different value of the multiplier and is flat elsewhere (See 
fig.6). The interval (fi., 80) is determined by the condition:
When v(O) = 0, the constant piece has the interpretation of a cancellation of
delivery (x = 0) that the agent selects with an associated transfer t determining the 
level of the payment. If t < 0 it can be interpreted as a cancellation fee that the agent
must pay when he chooses not to transact. If t > 0, it can be interpreted as an hostage
given by the principal to encourage the agent to sign e."< ante (see Williamson (1983) ) .  
\Vhen both constraints (5. 7)(5.8) may be binding the solution is more difficult to 
describe because the contraints on state variables may induce jumps at the optimal 
solution. 
' 
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The question of implementability of first best allocations reduces. then to the 
characterization of cases when the first best utility profile of the agent.is increasing and 
convex. 
An interesting result is obtained when the principal's utility function is: 
(5. 14) f(t) - x 
We then have: 
Theorem 1. For the utility functions (&. 6)(5.14) the first best allocation is implementable
via delegation and P-led renegotiation iff the index of absolute risk aversion of v is 
decreasing: 
(5.15) 
(5. 16) 
Proof. In this case the first best is such that
Ov'(x*( 0)) = ).* for any e. 
Hence, 
x*' = - v' x*• = --,.,.--fj v • 
2v' 
2 e v • 
2 
VI VI I I 
e 2 3 v • 
In the first best r(t*(B)) = ..\*; therefore t* is constant. Differentiating twice. 
the agent's utility function we obtain: 
(5.1 i) - v'(x*(O))x*'(8) + Ov• (x*(B))(x*'(O)) 2 
+ Ov'(x*(B))x*"(B) + v'(x*(B))x*'(8) 
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The differentiation of (5.15) shows that the first two terms of (5.17) cancel. Using 
(5.16) we obtain 
d
2
w*(O) v d 
d 02
=-).*ev· dx 
Hence the result from Theorem 3 
Q.E.D. 
v' [---v--] > 0.
41 
6. Examples 
From section 2 we know that A-led renegotiation, being a special case of 
incentive compatible mechanism,.is dominated by a contract of the type delegation and 
P-led renegotiation. However, authentic delegation may be necessary, i.e. A-led 
renegotiation may not be dominated by any simple contract with reneg�tiation. We
provide below such an e.xample. 
Examole 1: u(x,t,8) = -t + Bv(x) 
f(t,x) - f(t-x) 
In the first best we have f(t*(B)-x*(B)) =constant and therefore 
f(t*(B) - x*(B)) =constant. 
\iVith a constant contract (x, t) followed by renegotiation, the principal solves: 
Max f(t -x) 
A A 
Ov(x) -t < Ov(x) -t
reaching a level of utility which varies with e and is therefore different from the first best
level. 
To implement the first best allocation with a simple contract with A-led 
renegotiation, the principal can choose x,t such that 
. . 
f(t - x) - f(t*(B)-x*(O)) = canst.
Then the agent s olves: 
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Ma.x - t + 9v(x)
subject to f(t - x) � f(t*( 0) - x*( 0))
and reaches the first best allocation. 
It should be clear that the mechanism delegation and P-led renegotiation is more
powerful than a contract with agent's control. We illustrate this point with the e.�ample 
used in theorem 4. 
u(x,t,O) - - t + 9v(x) 
f(t,x) - f(t) - x 
Under the increasing absolute risk aversion of v the first best is reached by 
d ele ga tio n and P-led renegotiation. As t* is constant in the first best and x* increasing
the principal's utility level is decreasing in e in the first best and we know that A-led 
renegotiation implements only constant utility levels for the principal. Indeed th is latter 
. 
mechanism is just a p art icu lar incentive compatible mechanism and here the first best is 
not incentive compatible and requires renegotiation. This is because whenever t* is
constant x* must be constant to in sure incentive compatibility. 
On the contrary, in example 1 renegotiation is not really needed because the first 
best is incentive compatible. From efficiency, 
r = ,\ and r = ,\Ov'(x) 
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Incentive compatibility requires: 
-t' + Ov'(x)x' = 0 
or from efficiency 
x' -t' - 0 
But as in the first best the principal's utility is constant x' = t'. 
Implementation of a given first best allocation must be distinguished from . 
implementation of first best levels of utilities when first best allocations are not unique. 
The following e.-xample illustrates that implementation of a given first best allocation is 
much more demanding that implementation of first best levels of utility. 
Exanmle � u(x,t,8) = -t + Ov(x) 
f(t,x) = t + f(x) 
In a first best allocation r(x*(B)) = Ov'(x*(8)) but t*(8) is only constrained by 
J t*( 8)dF( 8) = - w + J Ov(x*(
_
8))dF( 8) - K 
One particular first best allocation is then 
t*( B) = K V 8, x*( 8) such that r(x) = Ov'(x)
This allocation is implementable via delegation and P-led renegotiation iff 
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d2 
__,,_ (- K + 9v'(x*(8))) � 0
d 8 2 
or after a few manipulations 
f. 2 -2 f. 8 v.
(f•- ev•)2 
d : v' 
which obtains under our assumptions if crx· [----v-J > 0 (as in Theorem 4) and
d f .  
moreover if d x [- f , ] > 0.
However, first best level of utilities are always implemented with A-led 
renegotiation. The principal chooses x, t such that 
t - f(�) = J[t*( 8) - f(x*( O))]dF( 8) - K 
Then the agent selects the efficient x*( 8) and chooses 
t*(O) = f(x*(O)) - J f(x*(O))dF(8) + K
which gives to him and to the principal the same expected utility level as in any first best 
allocation. 
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